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INTRODUCTION

This article will review the major developments in Illinois substantive criminal law since July, 1985. The article does not purport to be an exhaustive study of every court decision or piece of
legislation. The discussion of the case law will be limited to Illinois
Supreme Court decisions. The survey of legislation will cover new
laws enacted since July, 1985.
II.

CASE LAW

The Illinois Supreme Court, during its 1985-86 term, issued several important decisions in the area of substantive criminal law.
For example, the court addressed the problem of legally inconsistent verdicts' and jury instructions in homicide cases.2 The court
also construed provisions in statutes governing the following
crimes: robbery; 3 theft;4 driving under the influence ("DUI");5
criminal drug conspiracy; 6 and gambling.7 In addition, the court
examined the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,' and various sentencing statutes. 9 Finally, the court ruled on the constitutionality
1. See infra notes 14-35 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-1 (1985). See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1 (1985). See infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501(a) (1985). See infra notes 109-28, 204-15
and accompanying text.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1405 (1985). See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 28-1.1(d) (1985). See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 (1985). See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005 (1985). See infra notes 153-83 and accompanying text.
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of statutes defining unlawful restraint,'° residential burglary,

I

ag-

gravated arson, 12 and DUI.' 3

A.

Crimes Against The Person

1. Homicide: Legally Inconsistent Verdicts
In People v. Spears,'4 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
frequently occurring problem of legally inconsistent jury verdicts. 5
The court previously addressed this problem in People v. Hoffer.' 6
In Hoffer, the court held that simultaneous guilty verdicts for murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, based
on a single act, were legally inconsistent. Because those offenses
involved mutually inconsistent mental states, the Hoffer court ordered a new trial. '7 In Spears, the court faced the problem of inconsistent verdicts not in the specific context of a homicide case,
but rather in the analogous context of an attempt (murder)
prosecution. I8
The defendant in Spears had been charged with attempt (murder) 9 and armed violence, 2° based on his firing of two gunshots at
his estranged wife and a third shot at his wife and her friend. 2 1 The
three shots had been fired in rapid succession.22 At the defendant's
request, the jury was instructed regarding the lesser included of10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-3 (1985). See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 19-3(a) (1985). See infra notes 96-101, 250-56 and
accompanying text.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1985). See infra notes 102-05, 244-46 and
accompanying text.
13.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 11-501(a) (1985). See infra notes 109-25, 204-15

and accompanying text.
14. 112 Ill. 2d 396, 493 N.E.2d 1030 (1986).
15. Id. at 403, 493 N.E.2d at 1033. Inconsistent verdicts are mutually repugnant or
contradictory. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 689 (5th ed. 1979).
16. 106 Ill. 2d 186, 478 N.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 139 (1985).
17. Id. at 190-96, 478 N.E.2d at 338-41. The problem of legally inconsistent verdicts
in homicide cases arises in large part because of the manner in which the offenses are
structured in the Illinois Criminal Code. In essence, the Code treats murder as a lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. This anomaly creates not only problems of
inconsistent verdicts, but also problems in drafting coherent jury instructions. See Haddad, Allocation of Burdens in Murder-Voluntary ManslaughterCases: An Affirmative Defense Approach, 59 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 23 (1982) for an insightful analysis of these
problems. See also infra notes 35, 200 and accompanying text.
18. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 400, 493 N.E.2d at 1031.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-4 (1985).
20. Id. at para. 33A.
21. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 401, 493 N.E.2d at 1031-32.
22. Id. at 401, 493 N.E.2d at 1032.
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fense of reckless conduct in addition to the two charged offenses.23
The jury returned verdicts of guilty for the three offenses. 24 The
trial court entered judgment on the three verdicts, but the appellate
court reversed the convictions, finding that the verdicts were legally inconsistent."
On review, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal and
remanded the case for a new trial.26 Relying on Hoffer, the court
held that the guilty verdicts were logically and legally inconsistent.
The attempt (murder) and armed violence charges required the
jury to find that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly,27
while the reckless conduct charge required the jury to find only
that he acted with recklessness.28
The Spears court distinguished Hoffer from its intervening decision in People v. A/mo. 29 In Almo, the jury initially had returned

guilty verdicts for murder and voluntary manslaughter. 30 The trial
court, however, refused to accept those verdicts and reinstructed
the jury, whereupon it returned a verdict of guilty on the murder
charge. 31 The supreme court in Almo held that the trial court acted properly by refusing to accept the verdicts and reinstructing
the jury, thereby curing the inconsistent verdict dilemma. 32 Accordingly, the Almo court concluded that the case was not controlled by Hoffer.3 3 The trial court in Spears had not followed the
procedure utilized in Almo. Thus, the supreme court held that
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
cated

Id. at 399-400, 493 N.E.2d at 1031.
Id. at 402, 493 N.E.2d at 1032.
Id. at 400, 493 N.E.2d at 1031.
Id. at 410, 493 N.E.2d at 1036.
Id. at 406, 493 N.E.2d at 1034. The armed violence charges in Spears were predion aggravated battery which requires the mental state of knowledge. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38 para. 12-4 (1985).
28. Spears, at 403-08, 493 N.E.2d at 1033-35. The court rejected the State's argument that the three shots constituted separable acts which could support inconsistent
verdicts. The Spears court emphasized that the shots had been fired in rapid succession
and that each charge as alleged in the information was based on the defendant's entire
course of conduct. Id. at 403-06, 493 N.E.2d at 1033-34.
29. 108 Ill. 2d 54, 483 N.E.2d 203 (1985).
30, Id. at 61, 483 N.E.2d at 206.
31. Id. at 61, 483 N.E.2d at 206.
32. Id. at 63-64, 483 N.E.2d at 207.
33. Id. at 62-63, 483 N.E.2d at 206-07. The defendant in Almo also had argued that
the original verdicts were not legally inconsistent, and that the trial court should have
entered judgment on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. The basis for this
argument was that the jury instruction for murder given in Almo had omitted the socalled "fourth proposition," requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted without
belief that his use of force was justified. The defendant argued that this omission lead the
jury to erroneously conclude that the mental states for murder and voluntary manslaughter were consistent. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal No. 27.01
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Hoffer controlled Spears.3 4
Read together, Spears and AImo clarify and limit Hoffer. A new
trial shall be required only when the trial court accepts the legally
inconsistent verdicts and enters judgment on them. Thus, if the
court takes steps to obtain a consistent verdict, as in Almo, the
ultimate conviction may stand. Although Spears and Almo provide guidelines for trial courts to use when faced with legally inconsistent verdicts, those cases fail to address the underlying
problem of inartfully drafted jury instructions and verdict forms
that result in inconsistent verdicts.3 5
2.

Homicide: Jury Instruction Issues

In People v. Perez,36 the supreme court held that if the defendant
could not be found guilty of a lesser offense, then the trial court is
not required to give a lesser included offense instruction.37 The
defendant in Perez, a prison inmate, was convicted of murder for
stabbing a fellow inmate to death. 3 At trial, the defendant sought
a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of aggravated battery, arguing that the evidence supported the conclusion that he
was not responsible or accountable for the death.3 9 The trial court,
however, refused to give the instruction.'
On review, the supreme court affirmed the conviction. 41 The
court held that "an included-offense instruction is required only in
cases where the jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of
the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense."' 4 2 The
court then reviewed the evidence at trial and concluded that the
evidence of both direct responsibility 43 and accountability' for
(1968). The Almo court, however, rejected this argument. Almo, 108 Ill. 2d at 64-65, 483
N.E.2d at 207-08.
34. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 409-10, 493 N.E.2d at 1036.
35. See generally Haddad, supra note 17.
36. 108 Ill. 2d 70, 483 N.E.2d 250, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 898 (1985).
37. Id. at 81, 483 N.E.2d at 255.
38. Id. at 77, 483 N.E.2d at 253.
39. Id. at 77-81, 483 N.E.2d at 253-255.

40. Id. at 80, 483 N.E.2d at 255.
41. Id. at 81-84, 483 N.E.2d at 255-56.
42. Id. at 81, 483 N.E.2d at 255. In reaching this holding, the court assumed that
aggravated battery was a lesser included offense of murder. Id.
43. Id. at 81-82, 483 N.E.2d at 255. The defendant was "directly responsible" for the
death because he admitted to stabbing the victim in the side with a weapon compatible
with the fatal wound. Id.
44. Id. at 83, 483 N.E.2d at 256. "[Even though defendant's actions may have been
spontaneous, his participation in the stabbing made him legally accountable for the actions of every other member of the group." Id.
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murder precluded a jury from rationally finding the defendant
guilty of only aggravated battery. 45 Accordingly, the Perez court
held that the trial court was not required to give the lesser included
offense instruction.46
In People v. Sloan,47 the supreme court again addressed the issue
of jury instructions in a homicide case. The defendant in Sloan
was convicted of murder and home invasion.48 He requested and
was refused self-defense and voluntary manslaughter instructions
despite his assertions that he had feared that the victim would attack him because the room was dark and he could not tell whether
the victim had anything in his hands.49 On appeal, the supreme
court affirmed the convictions,5" concluding that the defendant's
belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm was not reasonable. 51 The court held that the victim was
entitled to use force because the defendant had invaded the premises armed with a shotgun, and therefore clearly had provoked any
show of force by the victim.52 Because the defendant's use of force
could not have been justified, the supreme court determined that
the trial judge correctly had refused the 3defendant's self-defense
5
and voluntary manslaughter instructions.
3.

Sexually Dangerous Persons

In People v. Allen,54 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
45. Id. at 82-83, 483 N.E.2d at 255-56.
46. Id. at 81, 483 N.E.2d at 255.
47. 111 Ill. 2d 517, 490 N.E.2d 1260 (1986).
48. Id. at 518, 490 N.E.2d at 1261.
49. Id. at 520, 490 N.E.2d at 1262.
50. Id. at 521, 490 N.E.2d at 1262.
51. Id. In concluding that the defendant's belief was unreasonable, the court relied on
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 7-4(c) (1983) which provides in part:
The justification described in the preceding Sections of this Article is not available to a person who:
(a) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission
of, a forcible felony; or
(c) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless:
(1) Such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he is in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm, and that he has exhausted every
reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which
is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
(2) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant
and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw the use of
force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.
52. Sloan, 111 Ill. 2d at 521, 490 N.E.2d at 1262-63.
53. Id. at 520-21, 490 N.E.2d at 1262.
54. 107 111. 2d 91, 481 N.E.2d 690 (1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
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State is required to prove only one act of attempt (sexual assault)
or sexual molestation for a defendant to be considered a sexually
dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act ("the
Act")." Because the Act is designed to prevent crimes by predicting a defendant's future conduct, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that an adjudication of sexual dangerousness should depend on proof of more than one sex crime.5 6 In reaching this result, the supreme court found that the plural language in the
statute referred to the "defendant's future propensities, not to the
demonstrated conduct.""7
4.

Unlawful Restraint
8

In People v. Wisslead,1 the court analyzed three issues pertaining to the unlawful restraint statute. 9 The first issue involved

whether a charging information that mirrored the language of the
statute sufficiently apprised the defendant of the nature of the
charge.6 ° In some cases, an information worded in accordance
with the statutory language does not adequately inform the defend-

ant of the nature and elements of the offense charged. 61 The
Wisslead court, however, concluded that the information was sufficient because the statutory language adequately described the specific charged conduct.6 2

The court also held that the classification of unlawful restraint as
55. Id. at 104-05, 481 N.E.2d at 696-97. The Act provides:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed
for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the
petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of
sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared
sexually dangerous persons."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 (1985).
56. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 105, 481 N.E.2d at 697.
57. Id. at 105, 481 N.E.2d at 697.
58. 108 Ill. 2d 389, 484 N.E.2d 1081 (1985).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-3 (1985).
60. Wisslead, 108 Ill. 2d at 393-94, 484 N.E.2d at 1082. The state and the federal
constitutions require that a charging instrument set forth "the nature and elements of the
offense charged." Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 111-3 (a)(3)(1983)). The
information in Wisslead stated that "a person commits the offense of unlawful restraint
when he knowingly without legal authority detains another." Id.
61. See People v. Heard, 47 Ill. 2d 501, 266 N.E.2d 340 (1970)(charge written in
accordance with the statutory language listed possible gambling offenses but failed to
specify which of the many possible acts the defendant committed); People v. Griffin, 36
Ill. 2d 430, 431, 223 N.E.2d 158, 159 (1967) (complaint alleged that the defendant drove
-with a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property," without
specifying the conduct).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-3(a) (1985).
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a Class 4 felony is not irrational.6 3 The defendant argued that un64
lawful restraint is a less serious offense than aggravated assault
which is a Class A misdemeanor. 65 Because the two offenses are

clearly distinct, the court concluded that it was not irrational to
prescribe greater penalties for unlawful restraint than for aggravated assault.6 6
Finally, the Wisslead court held that the unlawful restraint statute is not unconstitutionally vague. 67 The court noted that the
statute clearly informs an ordinary citizen what conduct is prohibited. 68 The court observed no vagueness problems in the statute
because it clearly defines unlawful restraint as the unlawful restriction of another's freedom.6 9
5.

Theft versus Robbery: Definition of "Force"

In People v. Bowel,7" the supreme court determined the amount
of force required to commit a robbery.71 The defendant in Bowel
was charged with robbery based on a purse snatching.7 2 The victim was aware that the defendant was approaching; he immobilized her hand by pushing it back, causing the victim to turn
slightly.73 The court held that this was sufficient force to constitute
a robbery.74
The supreme court distinguished Bowel from its earlier decision
in People v. Patton,75 thus drawing a narrow distinction between
63. Wisslead, 108 Ill. 2d at 398-99, 484 N.E.2d at 1085.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-2 (b) (1985).
65. Wisslead, 108 Ill. 2d at 399-400, 484 N.E.2d at 1085. The only basis for the defendant's argument was that false imprisonment, the forerunner of unlawful restraint,
was once a form of aggravated assault. Id. See People v. Cohoon, 315 Ill. App. 259, 42
N.E.2d 969 (4th Dist. 1942). Under the present law, unlawful restraint is neither a form
of aggravated assault nor is it a lesser included offense. Wisslead, 108 Ill. 2d at 399- 400,
484 N.E.2d at 1085. Aggravated assault is concerned with threatened bodily harm,
whereas unlawful restraint is concerned with the actual restriction of another's freedom
to move about. Id.
66. Wisslead, 108 Ill. 2d at 400, 484 N.E.2d at 1085.
67. Id. at 397-98, 484 N.E.2d at 1084. The offense of unlawful restraint is committed
when one "knowingly without legal authority detains another." Id. (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-3(a) (1983)).
68. Wisslead, 108 Ill. 2d at 397-98, 484 N.E.2d at 1084.
69. Id.
70. 111 Ill. 2d 58, 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986).
71. Id. at 63, 488 N.E.2d at 997. Robbery is committed when one "takes property
from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent
use of force." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 18-1 (1985).
72. Bowel, 111 111. 2d at 64, 488 N.E.2d at 998.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 63, 488 N.E.2d at 997.
75. 76 Ill. 2d 45, 389 N.E.2d 1174 (1979).
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the crime of robbery and theft from the person. In Patton, the
defendant had "swiftly grabbed" the victim's purse, throwing her
arm back a little.7 6 The court reasoned that this force was not sufficient to constitute robbery, and therefore, held the defendant
guilty merely of theft from the person. 7 Although the use of force
in Patton differed only slightly from that in Bowel, the court distinguished the cases on the ground that the victim in Bowel knew that
the defendant was approaching, whereas the victim in Patton did
not realize what was happening until after the defendant had begun
his flight.78 Thus, the victim's apprehension of force distinguishes
the two cases.
B.

Crimes Against Property
1. Theft

v. Brenizer,79

In People
the supreme court enlarged the scope of
felony theft by holding that a series of misdemeanor thefts based
on a single design could be aggregated for purposes of charging the
defendant with a single count of felony theft." The defendant in
Brenizer, a restaurant manager, appropriated restaurant goods for
his own use on fifty-four occasions over a two and a half year period." On each of the fifty-four occasions, the stolen property did
not exceed three hundred dollars in value, rendering each individual act only a Class A misdemeanor.8 2 The State, however, aggregated the fifty-four incidents and charged the defendant with one
count of theft of property exceeding three hundred dollars, a Class
3 felony. 3 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for severance.8 4 The defendant alleged
76. Id. at 47, 389 N.E.2d at 1175.
77. Id. at 52, 389 N.E.2d at 1177.
78. Id. at 48, 389 N.E.2d at 1175.
79. 111 Ill. 2d 220, 489 N.E.2d 862 (1986).
80. Id. at 226, 489 N.E.2d at 865.
81. Id. at 222, 489 N.E.2d at 863.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(1) (1985). The sentence of imprisonment
for a Class A misdemeanor is any term less than one year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-8-3 (a)(l) (1985).
83. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(3) (1985). The sentence for a term of imprisonment for a Class 3 felony shall not be less than two years or more than five years. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(6) (1985).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 111-4(c) (1985). Paragraph 111-4(c) provides that
two or more thefts can be charged as a single offense if such acts "are in furtherance of a
single intention and design," and if the property is taken from the same person. Brenizer,
ll Ill 2d. at 224, 489 N.E.2d at 864 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 111-4(c)
(1981)). Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed that the requirements of section 111-4(c) had been met and that the offenses could be joined. Id. at 225, 489 N.E.2d
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that the offenses charged were separate and distinct, and that the
State impermissibly had joined the offenses in an attempt to enhance the combined misdemeanors to a felony."s The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, held that aggregation of several misdemeanor thefts into one felony theft charge was proper under section 111-4(c) of the Illinois Criminal Code even though the statute
does not explicitly mention aggregation.8 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court asserted that the "total value of the property taken
will determine whether the theft constitutes a misdemeanor or a
felony". 87
In People v. Davis,s" the defendant offered to obtain an early
prison release for the victim's boyfriend if she would pay $4000.9
The victim notified the Department of Law Enforcement about the
defendant's
proposal because she considered him to be a
"phony." 9° Subsequently, the trial court convicted the defendant
of theft by deception 9 and the appellate court affirmed. 92 Holding
that the victim must rely on the defendant's misrepresentations to
sustain a theft by deception conviction, 93 the supreme court reversed and reduced the conviction to the lesser included offense of
attempt (theft by deception). 94 The court determined that the victim's awareness of the deceptive conduct precluded a conviction of
theft by deception. 95
at 865. Neither court, however, had aggregated the value of those successive misdemeanor thefts and charged a single offense of felony theft. Brenizer, 111 111. 2d at 225,
226, 489 N.E.2d at 865.
85. Brenizer, 111 111. 2d at 222, 223, 489 N.E.2d at 864.
86. Id. at 226, 489 N.E.2d at 865. The Brenizer decision was based on two appellate
court decisions in which aggregation was discussed, but not implemented because other
aspects of 111-4(c) were not met. See People v. Giles, 35 Ill. App. 3d 514, 341 N.E.2d 410
(4th Dist. 1976); People v. Adams, 26 Ill. App. 3d 324, 325 N.E.2d 71 (4th Dist. 1975).
The Brenizer court also relied upon an early Illinois Supreme Court case in which the
fraudulent taking of gas over a period of time constituted one taking and the defendant
was prosecuted for grand larceny based on the aggregate value of the stolen gas. Woods
v. People, 222 Ill. 293 (1906). The court in Brenizer also reasoned that the purpose of
section 111-4(c) would not be served if the merging of several misdemeanors would constitute only one misdemeanor. Brenizer, 111 Ill.
2d at 228, 489 N.E.2d at 866.
87. Brenizer, 111 111. 2d at 229, 489 N.E.2d at 866.
88. 112 Ill. 2d 55, 491 N.E.2d 1153 (1986).
89. Id. at 58, 491 N.E.2d at 1154.
90. Id.
91.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(b) (1985). The defendant was also convicted

of two counts of bribery in violation of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33-1 (1985). Davis,
112 Ill. 2d at 57, 491 N.E.2d at 1154.
92. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d at 57, 491 N.E.2d at 1154.
93. Id. at 63, 491 N.E.2d at 1156.
94. Id. at 63, 491 N.E.2d at 1157.
95. Id.
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Residential Burglary

In People v. Bales,9 6 the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
the residential burglary statute was not vague, ambiguous, or violative of due process. 97 In Bales, the trial court had found that there
was no difference between residential burglary and burglary, and
thus held that the residential burglary statute violated due process. 98 The supreme court reversed, holding that the definition of
"dwelling" found in section 2-6 of the Criminal Code cannot be
read in conjunction with the residential burglary statute which
identifies "dwelling place of another." 9 9 The supreme court defined "dwelling place of another" as any place of residence where
the owners actually reside, or intend to reside within a reasonable
period of time."° The supreme court reasoned that the phrase
"dwelling place of another" was not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence could understand it. Moreover, the court concluded that the residential burglary statute
passed constitutional muster because it did not give "law-enforcement authorities unreasonable and arbitrary discretion over
whether to charge a defendant with residential burglary or
burglary."'' 1
96. 108 Ill. 2d 182, 483 N.E.2d 517 (1985).
97. Id. at 192, 483 N.E.2d at 521. The Bales court also held that the legislative classification of residential burglary as a Class 1 felony, when burglary is a Class 2 felony, does
not violate equal protection, because there is a greater chance that bodily harm would
result. Id. at 192-94, 483 N.E.2d at 522. Moreover, the court in Bales concluded that
the sentencing scheme does not violate the limitation-of-penalties provision of the Illinois
Constitution, which states that "all penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
98. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 188, 483 N.E.2d at 519. The residential burglary statute
provides:
A person commits residential burglary who knowingly and without authority
enters the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a felony
or theft.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 19-3(a) (1985).
The burglary statute provides, in relevant part:
A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or
without authority remains within a building, housetrailer . . . with intent to
commit therein a felony or theft .... This offense shall not include the offense
of residential burglary as defined in Section 19-3 hereof.
Id. at 19-1(a).
99. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 189, 483 N.E.2d at 520.
100. Id. at 191, 483 N.E.2d at 521 This language was used in amending the definition
of dwelling in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-6 (1985). See also, Buser, The Illinois
Residential Burglary Statute: When Is An Invaded Structure A 'Dwelling'? 73 ILL. B.J.
262 (1985).
101. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 192, 483 N.E.2d at 521. The impact of the Bales decision,
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Aggravated Arson

In People v. Wick,1 1 2 the Illinois Supreme Court held that section
(a)(3) of the aggravated arson statute violated due process. 1° 3 The
section at issue provided that a person commits aggravated arson,
as opposed to simple arson, if a fireman or policeman is injured in
the fire. 10 4 In Wick, the defendant was charged with aggravated
arson for setting fire to his tavern. The fire resulted in a fireman
being treated as an outpatient for smoke inhalation. 5
On appeal of the defendant's Class X conviction for aggravated
arson, the supreme court held that section (a)(3) of the aggravated
arson statute violated due process because it did not satisfy the
"reasonable relationship" test.' The court stated that the statute,
which punished anyone who caused a fire injuring a fireman, was
not reasonably related to the legislative purpose of severely punishhowever, has been limited by a recent legislative enactment which redefines "dwelling"
for the purposes of the residential burglary statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-6
(Supp. 1986). See also infra, notes 250-56 and accompanying text. The amendment defines 'dwelling' as a "house, apartment, mobile home, trailer or other living quarter in
which at the time of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their
absence intend within a reasonable period of time to reside." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 2-6 (Supp. 1986).
102. 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1985). In People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 69,
499 N.E.2d 470 (1986), the Illinois Supreme Court held that subsection (1) of section 201.1(a)(1) of the aggravated arson statute was unconstitutional based on the reasoning in
Wick.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1(a)(3) (1985). The provision of the aggravated arson statute at issue in Wick provides in relevant part:
A person commits aggravated arson when by means of fire or explosive he
knowingly damages, partially or totally, any building or structure, and . . . a
fireman or policeman who is present at the scene acting in the line of duty, is
injured as a result of the fire or explosion.
Id. at para. 20-1.1(a)(3). Aggravated arson is a Class X felony, punishable by not less
than six years and not more than 30 years imprisonment. Id. at para. 1005-8- l(a)(3)
(1985). Simple arson, on the other hand, is a Class 2 felony, punishable by a term of not
less than three years and not more than seven years imprisonment. Id. at para. 1005-8l(a)(5) (1985). The simple arson statute provides in relevant part:
A person commits arson when, by means of fire or explosive he knowingly:
(a) Damages any real property, or any personal property having a value of
$150 or more, of another without his consent; or
(b) With intent to defraud an insurer, damages any property or any personal
property having a value of $150 or more.
Id. at para. 20-1.
105. Wicks, 107 Ill. 2d at 63, 481 N.E.2d at 677.
106. Id. at 66, 481 N.E.2d at 678. "The question of whether a legislative exercise of
the police power meets the constitutional requirement of due process involves identifying
the public interest, examining whether the statute 'bears a reasonable relationship' to that
interest, and determining whether the method used to protect or further that interest is
reasonable." Id.
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07
ing arsonists, as opposed to non-arsonists, for injuring firemen.
The court determined that the aggravated arson statute was unconstitutional because it imposed a penalty greater than that for simple arson, while the mens rea requirement for aggravated arson
was less than that for simple arson. 0 8

C.

Crimes Affecting Public Health, Safety, and Decency
1.

Driving Under the Influence

Most of the recent changes in the law regarding driving under
the influence ("DUI") were made by the Illinois General Assembly. 1 9 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, issued two important
opinions in this area of law during the Survey year.
In People v. Coleman, 110 the supreme court held that increased
penalties for repeat DUI offenders did not violate the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws."' In Coleman, the defendant was charged with DUI." 2 Three years earlier, the defendant
was arrested for the same offense, and received a sentence of supervision in exchange for a guilty plea. 1' 3 In between the two offenses
committed by the defendant, the General Assembly enacted section 5-6-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provided
that a DUI defendant may not be sentenced to supervision for a
second offense committed within five years of the date that he received supervision for the first DUI charge." 4 The defendant
107. Id. The Wick court noted that "[u]nder this statute for example, a farmer who
demolishes his deteriorated barn to clear space for a new one is liable for a Class X
penalty if a fireman standing by is injured at the scene." Id.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1985). As with the Bales decision regarding residential burglary, the effect of Wick has been limited by legislative action. The
aggravated arson statute has been amended so that arson is now a lesser included offense
of aggravated arson. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
110. 111 Ill. 2d 87, 488 N.E.2d 1009 (1986).
111. Id. An ex post facto law is "a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 520 (5th ed. 1979). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1.
112. Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d at 91, 488 N.E.2d at 1011 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2,
para. 11-501(a) (1985)).
113. Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d at 91, 488 N.E.2d at 1011.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-1(d) (1985) provides:
The provisions of paragraph (c) shall not apply to a defendant charged with
violating Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a
local ordinance if said defendant has previously been convicted or assigned supervision for a violation of Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a
similar provision of a local ordinance within a 5 year period commencing on the
date the defendant was previously convicted or assigned supervision.
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claimed that because the statute was passed after his first trial, it5
violated the consitutional proscription against ex post facto laws.' 1
The supreme court, however, disagreed, stating that the purpose
of the prohibition against ex post facto laws was to ensure "that
persons have a right to fair warning of the conduct which will give
rise to criminal penalties.""' 6 The supreme court reasoned that
since section 5-6-1(d) became effective January 1, 1984, and the
defendant was arrested for the second offense seven months later,
he had adequate notice of the recidivist statute by the time of the
7
second arrest."i

The defendant in Coleman also argued that section 5-6-1(d) violated equal protection because the previous charges against him for
DUI were dismissed after he successfully completed the supervision. The defendant contended that, as a result, there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing him from those who had not been
convicted of DUI." 8 Based on the general rule that equal protection principles do not deny the State the power to treat disparate
classes of people differently," 9 the court concluded that a reasonable basis existed to treat the defendant differently because he was
a member of a class of people who tendered guilty pleas to DUI
20
charges.

In People v. Murphy,"'2 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
certification requirements for lab technicians who analyze blood
12 2
alcohol contents are not applicable to cases other than DUI.

The defendant in Murphy was indicted for reckless homicide after
driving into a guardrail, fatally injuring the passenger. 23 At the
hospital, a blood sample was taken from the defendant and analyzed for alcohol content. 24 The defendant filed a motion to exclude the results of the chemical analysis on the basis that the
laboratory and technicians had not been certified under section 11 Id.
115. Coleman, 111 Ill.
2d at 91, 488 N.E.2d at 1011.
116. Id. at 93, 488 N.E.2d at 1012 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
191-92 (1977)).
117. Coleman, 11 Ill.
2d at 94, 488 N.E.2d at 1012. A recidivist is a habitual criminal or a criminal repeater. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (5th ed. 1979). A recidivist
statute is one that imposes harsher punishment for a repeating offender. Id.
118. Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d at 95, 488 N.E.2d at 1013.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 96, 488 N.E.2d at 1013.
121. 108 Ill.
2d 228, 483 N.E.2d 1288 (1985).
122. Id. at 234, 483 N.E.2d at 1290.
123. Id. at 230, 483 N.E.2d at 1288.
124. Id. at 230, 483 N.E.2d at 1288-89.
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501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.1 25 The trial court granted the
26
defendant's motion.1
On appeal, the supreme court reversed.' 27 The court held that
because the defendant was indicted for reckless homicide, the certification requirements established in section 11-501.2 did not apply.
The court thus concluded that the ordinary standards of admissibility governed the admissibility of chemical analysis results in a
128
reckless homicide case.
2.

Drugs

In People v. Harmison,129 the court examined the offense of calculated criminal drug conspiracy. This crime occurs whenever a
person conspires with two or more persons to manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with a value
over $500.11 ° The precise issue in Harmison was whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant had conspired with
at least two other persons. 131
The conspiracy at issue allegedly involved three persons, including the defendant.13 2 Although the evidence showed that the defendant and one other person had agreed, and a third person had
participated slightly in the offense, the supreme court held that this
evidence was insufficient to establish a calculated criminal drug
conspiracy. 3 3 The supreme court interpreted "conspiracy" as employed in the drug conspiracy statute to have the same meaning as
in ordinary conspiracy, which requires actual agreement between
the alleged co-conspirators. 134 The Harmison court held that without the actual agreement of three or more persons, there cannot be
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 11-501.2 (1985). Paragraph 11-501.2 applies to
proceedings "arising out of an arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11-501," which
addresses the offense of driving while under the influence. Murphy, 108 Ill. 2d at 232, 483
N.E.2d at 1289 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, paras. 11-501, 11-501.2 (1981)).
126. Murphy, 108 Ill. 2d at 230, 483 N.E.2d at 1288.
127. Id. at 234, 483 N.E.2d at 1290.
128. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court recently held that the rule announced in Murphy applies even when reckless homocide charges are tried with DUI charges. People v.
Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d 343, 498 N.E.2d 1140 (1986).
129. 108 Ill. 2d 197, 483 N.E.2d 508 (1985).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56'/2, para. 1405 (1985).
131. Harmison, 108 Ill. 2d. at 202, 483 N.E.2d at 510.
132. Id. at 203, 483 N.E.2d at 511.
133. Id.
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2 (1985). Paragraph 8-2 states "(a) Elements of
the offense. A person commits conspiracy when, with intent that an offense be committed, he agrees with another to the commission of that offense .... " Id.
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a calculated criminal drug conspiracy. 35
In People v. Upton, 1 36 the supreme court held that the statute
proscribing unlawful distribution of a look-alike substance 137 did
not violate due process. 38 In Upton, the defendant was convicted
of unlawful distribution of a look-alike substance. 139 The appellate
court reversed the conviction, holding that the statute violated due
process. The appellate court held the statute unconstitutional because the fine for delivery of a look-alike substance could be greater
than the fine for delivery of an actual controlled substance." ° The
supreme court, however, held that the newly amended statute did
not violate due process because the General Assembly justified the
look-alike statute by recognizing the "unique threat to 14public
1
health, safety and welfare posed by look-alike substances."'
In People v. Dale,142 the Illinois Supreme Court held that it is
constitutional for law enforcement personnel and the defendant to
testify as to the 143
amount of drugs seized in order to determine their
"street value."
The supreme court upheld the statute on the
ground that such testimony merely establishes the amount seized,
135. Harmison, 108 I11.2d at 203, 483 N.E.2d at 511. In People v. Lane, 133 Ill.
App. 3d 215, 478 N.E.2d 1160 (1st Dist. 1985), the court held that even though conspiracy requires that the defendant agree with at least two persons, three convictions are not
required under the calculated criminal drug conspiracy statute. Id. at 220, 478 N.E.2d at
1164. Applying Lane, a defendant may be convicted even when his alleged co-conspirators are acquitted. All that is necessary is proof of the conspiracy at the defendant's trial.
Id.
136. 114 Ill. 2d 362, - N.E.2d - (1986).
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, para. 1404(b) (1985). Paragraph 1404(b) states "[i]t is
unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, distribute, advertise, or possess with
intent to manufacture a look-alike substance. Any person who violates subsection (b)
shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony, the fine for which shall not exceed $150,000." Id.
138. Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 375, - N.E.2d at -.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, para. 1404 (1985).
140. Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 364-66, - N.E.2d at -.
141. Id. at 370-71, - N.E.2d at -. The special dangers cited by the legislature were
as follows: 1) look-alike drugs, particular appeal to and widespread marketing among
young people promotes acceptance of drug abuse; 2) misrepresentation as to ingredients
and effects of look-alike drugs leads to unanticipated reactions and confusion as to the
effects and dosage levels of actual controlled substances; 3) the wide availability of constituent ingredients results in great ease in manufacture and generates immense profits for
manufacturers and distributors; and 4) the pseudo drugs, actual ingredients, though varied, create additional serious health hazards when the manner of administration or ingestion parallels that usually associated with the substances being imitated. Upton, 114
Ill. 2d at 370-71, - N.E.2d at -.
142. 112 Ill. 2d 460, 493 N.E.2d 1060 (1986).
143. Id. at 466-67, 493 N.E.2d at 1062-63 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10059-1.1 (1983)). Paragraph 1005-9-1.1 provides that the street value of drugs shall be determined by the court and the amount seized shall be determined by testimony of law enforcement personnel and the defendant. Id.
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while other testimony, perhaps including testimony concerning the
current per unit going-rate for the substance, is required to prove
"street value" of the amount seized.' 44

3.

Gambling

v. Dugan,'4 5

In People
the supreme court held the recording 1of
of the offense of bookmaking. 46
element
necessary
a
not
is
bets
Although the defendants in Dugan had accepted more than five
bets or wagers in excess of $2,000, they argued that they could not
be convicted because the State failed to prove any bet recording
method.147 The defendants contended that keeping a record of the
bets or wagers was an essential element of the bookmaking offense. 148 The supreme court, however, rejected this claim, holding
that the gravamen of the offense was the acceptance of the requisite
number of bets.' 49 The court also clarified the use of the word
"business" in the syndicated gambling statute 5 ° by stating that
bookmaking need not be the defendant's occupation for him to be
guilty of that offense.15 ' Rather, the court concluded, all that is
needed is proof of at least five bets or wagers totalling more than
$2,000. 152
D.

Sentencing

153

The Illinois Supreme Court has issued three significant decisions
144. Dale, 112 I11.2d at 466, 493 N.E.2d at 1062.
145. 109 Ill. 2d 8, 485 N.E.2d 315 (1985).
146. Id. at 14-15, 485 N.E.2d at 318. The bookmaking statute provides:
A person engages in bookmaking when he receives or accepts more than five
bets or wagers upon the results of any trials or contests of skill, speed or power
of endurance or upon any lot, chance, casualty, unknown or contingent event
whatsoever, which bets or wagers shall be of such size that the total of the
amounts of money paid or promised to be paid to such bookmaker on account
thereof shall exceed $2,000. Bookmaking is the receiving or accepting of such
bets or wagers regardless of the form or manner in which the bookmaker
records them.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 28-1.1(d) (1985).
147. Dugan, 109 Ill. 2d at 13, 485 N.E.2d at 318.
148. Id. at 12, 485 N.E.2d at 317.
149. Id. at 13-15, 485 N.E.2d at 317-18. The Dugan court also reasoned that
although the legislature did not make record keeping an element of the offense, it was
assumed that a bookmaker with over $2,000 in bets would record them. Id. at 14, 485
N.E.2d at 318.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 28-1.1(b) (1985).
151. Dugan, 109 Ill. 2d at 15, 485 N.E.2d at 318.
152. Id.
153. During the Survey period, the supreme court issued other significant decisions
pertaining to sentencing. Those decisions are discussed in the CriminalProcedure article
of this Survey issue.
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in the area of sentencing. In the most recent decision, People v.
Ward, 54 the court held for the first time that a defendant's continued assertion of innocence after trial could properly be considered
as an aggravating factor at sentencing."' The court also reaffirmed
its prior holdings that a defendant's lack of remorse could be considered as an aggravating factor,1 5 6 and made it clear that a sentencing judge has broad discretion to determine a lack of
remorse. ' 57 The defendant in Ward had been convicted of burglary
in a bench trial. 58 At sentencing, the defendant maintained his
innocence. 5 9 The trial court found that the defendant's statement
reflected "no contrition" and therefore elected to impose a prison
term of twice the minimum.' 6° On appeal, the defendant argued
that the trial court's reliance on his assertion of innocence violated
due process by penalizing him for refusing to incriminate himself. 16' The supreme court rejected that argument. The court reasoned that a defendant has no "right to lie," and thus concluded
that a sentencing judge could legitimately consider the truthfulness
of the defendant's assertion in evaluating the defendant's character
and rehabilitative potential. 62 The court repeatedly emphasized
the broad discretion vested in the sentencing judge. The court cautioned that an assertion of innocence and lack of remorse "must
not be automatically and arbitrarily applied as aggravating factors," but added that a sentencing judge must be free to consider
"any relevant information concerning the defendant's character...
conveyed by his continued protestation of innocence and his lack
of remorse," viewed in light of all the circumstances known to the
court. 63 The court also indicated that the sentencing judge has
discretion to find a lack of remorse based on all the facts in the
record, and not simply when the defendant expressly declares an
unrepentant attitude. ' In addition to a continued assertion of innocence, other factors noted by the Ward court as potentially
154. 113 Ill. 2d 516, 499 N.E.2d 422 (1986).
155. Id. at 529-32, 499 N.E.2d at 427-28.
156. Id. at 529, 499 N.E.2d at 427. The Ward court reaffirmed its holdings in People
v. Albanese, 102 I11.2d 54, 464 N.E.2d 206 (1984), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1985),
People v. LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981), People v. Morgan, 59 Ill. 2d
276, 319 N.E.2d 764 (1974), and People v. Gomez, 29 Ill. 2d 432, 194 N.E.2d 299 (1963).
157. Ward at 530-31, 499 N.E.2d at 428.
158. Id. at 522, 499 N.E.2d at 423.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 524-25, 499 N.E.2d at 424-25.
161. Id. at 525, 499 N.E.2d at 425.
162. Id. at 531, 499 N.E.2d at 428.
163. Id. at 529-30, 499 N.E.2d at 427.
164. Id. at 530-31, 499 N.E.2d at 427-28.
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showing a lack of remorse included "tone of voice, facial expression, and general demeanor," none of which are necessarily revealed by the "cold record." 65 Presumably, the defendant's silence
could not be relied upon.
The import of Ward is to equate an assertion of innocence with a
lack of remorse. The decision therefore likely will silence those
convicted defendants who honestly believe they are innocent despite a contrary verdict. The only other safe choice for such defendants would be to make what they consider to be false
confessions, which might later be used against them on appeal, retrial, or collateral proceedings. Ward also might provide a pretext
for a trial court to impose a harsher sentence on a defendant
who
66
exercised his right to trial rather than pleading guilty.
In the second sentencing case, Morrow v. Dixon, 6 7 the defendant
was convicted of unlawful delivery of ten grams of cocaine, a Class
2 felony, 68 and was sentenced to three years in prison. 169 The
State subsequently sought either a supervisory order or a writ of
mandamus to compel the trial judge to sentence the defendant to a
minimum of six years as a Class X offender under the statute
which increases the sentence for a Class 1 or Class 2 felony to Class
X felony if the defendant previously has been convicted of at least
two Class 2 or greater felonies. 70 Though the State had presented
certified copies of the records of defendant's two prior felony convictions,' 7 the trial judge refused to sentence the defendant as a
72
Class X offender.
The supreme court noted that the Illinois General Assembly has
the authority to set the nature and extent of penalties and that a
statutory provision for a minimum sentence is mandatory and
must be obeyed. 73 Because the statute clearly mandated the imposition of a Class X sentence, the court held that the trial judge did
not have the discretion to sentence the defendant to a term outside
165. Id.
166. See Ward at 533-35, 499 N.E.2d at 429-30 (Simon, J., dissenting).
167. 108 Ill. 2d 223, 483 N.E.2d 876 (1985).
168. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.561/2, para. 1401(c) (1985).
169. Dixon, 108 Ill. 2d at 225, 483 N.E.2d at 876.
170. Id. at 225, 483 N.E.2d at 876 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-53(c)(8) (1984)).
171. Dixon, 108 IlL. 2d at 225, 226, 483 N.E.2d at 876, 877. The defendant was convicted in 1978 of burglary and robbery committed in 1978. In 1980, the defendant was
convicted of a burglary committed in 1980. The offense under consideration in the 1985
Dixon case was committed on April 10, 1984. Id.
172. Id. at 226, 483 N.E.2d at 877.
173. Id.
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the parameters of the statute. 74 Therefore, the court conditionally
awarded a writ of mandamus pending appeal of the conviction.
The third sentencing case was People v. Harden,175 in which the
supreme court held that a sentence under the extended term statute1 76 could be imposed on the basis of a federal conviction entered
in Illinois. 77 The statute authorizes an extended term sentence
"[w]hen a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been
previously convicted in Illinois of the same or greater class felony,
within 10 years. .... I7' The court noted that, while the statute
does not mention convictions in Illinois federal courts, it does not
explicitly limit its application to convictions in state courts. 179 Relying on the purpose of the statute,' public policy concerns, 18
and a prior Illinois appellate court decision," 2 the court held that a
sentence for an extended term could be based upon a federal con83
viction entered in Illinois.
III.

LEGISLATION

Since July 1985, there have been many significant changes in Illinois' substantive criminal law statutes. The General Assembly enacted major revisions in the DUI statute,8 4 abolished the feticide
statute 8 5 and replaced it with a variety of offenses, 8 6 and passed a
174. Id. at 227, 483 N.E.2d at 877.
175. 113 Ill. 2d 14, 495 N.E.2d 490 (1986).
176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch, 38, para. 1005-8-2(b) (1985).
177. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 20-21, 495 N.E.2d at 493.
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(b)(1)(1985). The defendant in Harden
was convicted of armed robbery and had a 1975 conviction in federal court for that same
offense. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 17, 495 N.E.2d at 491-92.
179. Harden, 113 Ill. 2d at 21, 495 N.E.2d at 494.
180. Id. The purpose of the statute is to impose harsher sentences on offenders whose
repeated convictions have shown their resistance to correction. Id.
181. Id. at 22, 495 N.E.2d at 494. The court reasoned that as a matter of public
policy, repeat offenders should be treated more harshly than first time offenders. The
court noted that this public policy has not been uniformly regarded by a statute which
imposes extended term sentences based on state court convictions but not federal court
convictions. Id.
182. Id. (citing People v. Robinson 91 Ill.
App. 3d 1128, 414 N.E.2d 1335 (1980)).
The Robinson court stated, "Notably, the phrase 'previously convicted in Illinois' is not
necessarily limited to a conviction arising solely in the Illinois State courts, but could
reasonably be construed to cover a conviction in Illinois in a Federal court for a Federal
offense.... [T]he Act provides for extended terms for crimes committed in Illinois, an
objective supported by giving equal consideration to similar Federal crimes committed in
Illinois." Robinson, 91 Ill.
App. 3d at 1132, 414 N.E.2d at 1338.
183. Harden, 113 I11.
2d at 20-21, 495 N.E.2d at 494.
184. See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 216-31 and accompanying text.
186. The new offenses include intentional homicide of an unborn child, voluntary
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law radically changing the homicide statute. 18 7 The legislature also
amended statutes governing unlawful use of weapons, 88 child abduction and sexual abuse,18 9 aggravated arson,1 90 theft,1 9' residential burglary, 92 and bribery.19 3 Finally, the legislature created the
new offenses of aggravated unlawful restraint, 94 disarming
a peace
9 6 and mail fraud. 97
officer, 9 5 public aid wire fraud,
A.
1.

Major Revisions

Murder/Voluntary Manslaughter

Public Act 84-1450198 changes the name of the offense of "murder" to "first degree murder" and changes "voluntary manslaughter" to "second degree murder." As in the previous statute, the
less serious offense of second degree murder is defined as first degree murder with mitigating factors. The crucial aspect of the
change is that the burden of proving the mitigating factors is
shifted from the State to the defendant. Under the old law, the
State had to prove the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to convict the defendant of voluntary manslaughter.
Under the new law, the defendant must prove the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence, and if the burden is not
met, the defendant will be convicted of murder in the first degree.
This new law represents the legislative response to the increasing
problem of legally inconsistent jury verdicts in homicide cases.' 99
This problem, however, may be less attributable to the current allocation of the burden of proof than to inartfully drafted jury instructions.2 " This law has engendered much controversy. By
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the new law may
manslaughter of an unborn child, involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child, battery
of an unborn child and aggravated battery of an unborn child. See infra notes 216-31 and
accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. 1986 Ill. Legis Serv. 84-1450 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
paras. 2-8, 9-1, 9-2).
199. See supra notes 14-35 and accompanying text.
200. See generally Haddad, supra note 17.
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pose constitutional problems.2 "° Moreover, under the new law,
prosecutors would no longer be able to charge the lesser offense,
but instead would be required to charge first degree murder even
when the evidence did not warrant such a charge.
Another amendment also reforms the homicide law.2"2 This
amendment authorizes an extended term sentence for persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, or
reckless homicide, when more than one person was killed.20 3 Finally, for persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, or reckless homicide, when more than one
person was killed. This new law authorizes an extended term
sentence.
2.

Driving Under the Influence

Public Act 84-272 made several changes in the DUI law, 2° the
most important being the imposition of a statutory summary suspension of the driver's license. 2 5 Formerly, there was an automatic license suspension only if the driver refused to take the
blood-alcohol test.20 6 Under the new law, automatic suspension
will occur not only when the driver refuses a request to take the
blood-alcohol test, but also when the test is taken and the driver
registers above the legal limit. 20 7 The license suspension does not
take effect until the driver receives written notice of the impending
suspension and is informed that he may request a hearing.20 8
201. In Martin v. Ohio, 107 S. Ct. 1098 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
recently held that it was not a violation of the due process clause for a state to place the
burden of proving self-defense on a defendant charged with murder. See also Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding a statute in which the mitigating factor was
not an element of the offense but instead an affirmative defense). But see Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (striking down a similar statute on the grounds that due
process requires the state to prove every element of an offense).
202. 1986 I11.Legis. Serv. 84-1441 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-5-3.2).
203. Id.
204. 1985 Ill. Laws 84-272. A new paragraph was added to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2
(1985), allowing the Secretary of State to suspend the driving privileges of persons arrested in another state for DUI. Id. at para. 6-203.1. The law also was amended to
provide that any person convicted of driving on a suspended license for a second time will
be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the license was suspended or revoked for DUI, involuntary
manslaughter or reckless homicide. Id. at para. 6-303. If the suspension or revocation
was for other reasons, the crime is a Class A misdemeanor. Id.
205. Id. at para. 1-203.1.
206. Id. at para. 11-501.1(c).
207. Id. at para. 1-203.1. The legal limit is 0.10. Id.
208. Id. at para. 2-118.1.
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Therefore, suspension is automatic, but a hearing is not. 2° 9 Any
person whose license has been summarily suspended shall not be
eligible for restoration of the privilege until: (1) six months from
the effective date of the statutory summary suspension ("SSS") if
he refused to take the alcohol test; (2) three months from the effective date of the SSS if a chemical test was taken and the defendant
registered over the legal limit; or (3) one year for all repeat DUI
offenders.21 °
To relieve the burden of the SSS, the new law provides for the
establishment of Judicial Driving Permits ("JDP"). 21' The permits
are given only in special circumstances 212 and are limited to the
petitioner's residence and place of employment, and to specific
days of the week and hours of the day.
Another important change made by this law was that the sentencing of reckless homicide was increased from a Class 4 felony to
a Class 3 felony.21 3 Also, in cases involving reckless homicide,
driving under the influence of alcohol or any other drug is now
prima facie evidence of a reckless act.214 Similarly, Public Act 84899 provides that a person involved in a motor vehicle accident
which results in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement to another is guilty of a Class 4 felony if the proximate
cause of the injuries is a violation of DUI. 2 5
3.

Feticide

Public Act 84-1414 repealed the feticide statute 21 6 and created a
variety of offenses against unborn children.2 17 These offenses in209. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), which addressed the due process
ramifications of such a law.
210. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 6-208.1 (1985).
211. Id. at para. 6-206.1. Previously the Secretary of State could issue driving permits, but under this new law, the courts can order the Secretary to do so. These JDP's
are only available to first time offenders and can only take effect after a 30 day suspension. Repeat offenders can try to obtain a permit directly from the Secretary of State. Id.
212. Id. at para. 6-206.1 (b). Prior to the issuance of a JDP, the court will consider 1)
whether the person is employed and no other means of commuting is available, 2)
whether the person must drive to secure alcohol or other medical treatment for himself or
a family member, 3) whether the person has been repeatedly convicted of traffic violations
or involved in motor vehicle accidents to a degree which indicates disrespect for public
safety, 4) whether the person has been in a traffic accident resulting in death within the
last 5 years, 5) whether the person is likely to obey the limited provisions of the JDP, and
6) whether the person has any additional traffic violations pending in any court. Id.
213. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3 (1985).
214. Id.
215. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, para. 11-501 (e) (1985).
216. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (1985).
217. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (Supp. 1986).
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clude intentional homicide of an unborn child,21 voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child,2 1 9 involuntary manslaughter of an
unborn child, 220 reckless homicide of an unborn child, 22 1 battery of
an unborn child,222 and aggravated battery of an unborn child.223
The old feticide law 224 required the same mens rea as found in
the murder statute. 25 In addition, the former law dictated that the
criminal act be directed against the mother, with the offender
knowing that she was carrying the fetus.226 Under the new law, a
criminal offense exists even if the intent is directed toward some
other individual.227 The only offense which requires knowledge of
the pregnancy is intentional homicide of an unborn fetus.228
The Act also abandons the term "fetus" for the broader term
"unborn child." Under the former feticide statute, "fetus" was defined as a fetus that could have sustained life outside the womb.229
The new law defines "unborn child" as an individual of the human
species from fertilization until birth.
Public Act 84-1414 thus expands the application of the former
feticide statute. The Act provides a potent tool for the prosecution. For instance, the State will now be able to prosecute anyone
who causes the death of an unborn child, regardless of its stage of
development, and even when the acts causing the death were performed recklessly; under provocation, or under a belief that force
218. Id. at para. 9-1.2(d)). The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child
will be the same as for murder, except that the death penalty may not be imposed. Id.
219. Id. at para. 9-2.1(c). Voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 1
felony. Id.
220. Id. at para. 9-3.2(b)(1). Involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 3
felony. Id.
221. Id. at para. 9-3.2(b)(2). Reckless homocide of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony. Id.
222. Id. at para. 12-3. 1(c). Battery of an unborn child is a Class A misdemeanor. Id.
223. Id. at para. 12-4.4(b). Aggravated battery of an unborn child is a Class 2 felony.
Id.
224. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (1985). The former feticide statute provided
that the offender "[e]ither intended to kill or do great bodily harm to the mother carrying
the fetus or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the mother
... or... he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to the mother." Id.
225. Id. at para. 9-1 (1985). The murder statute provides that the offender "[e]ither
intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another or knows that such
acts will cause death to that individual or another.., or. . . knows that such acts create a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another." Id.
226. Id. at para. 9-1.1 (1985).
227. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (Supp. 1986).
228. Id. at para. 9-1.2.
229. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1(b) (1985).
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was justified.23 ° The new law also makes it possible to prosecute
one who causes bodily
harm to an unborn child but does not cause
231
the child's death.

B. Other Amendments to Existing Statutes
1. Unlawful Use of Weapons
232
The amendments to the unlawful use of weapons statute
("UUW") were undoubtedly in response to the prevalent problem
of street gang related crimes. 233 Public Act 84-721 augmented the
UUW statute
by making it an offense to possess weapons on school
2 34
grounds.
Public Act 84-1074 converted the crime of selling or giving a
concealable firearm to a person under eighteen years of age to a
Class 4 felony. 235 Previously, this offense had been a Class A misdemeanor. The new law also makes it a Class 4 felony to sell or
give a firearm of any size to a person under eighteen years of age.23 6
2.

Child Abduction and Sexual Abuse

Public Act 84-234 expands the offense of child abduction.
Under the new law, it is a crime for a mother to abduct and intentionally conceal her own child whom she had abandoned or of
whom she had relinquished custody.2 37
230. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2, 12-3.1, 12-4.4 (Supp. 1986).
231. Id.
232.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 24 (1985).

233. Id. at para. 24-1. A minor amendment to the Unlawful Use of Weapons Statute
added the "throwing star" to the list of prohibited weapons. Id.
234. Id. The amendment makes it a crime to carry a weapon on the premises of any
elementary or secondary school, community college, or college or university. Id.
235. Id. at para. 24-3(a).
236. Id. This new law only applies to a person under 18 who does not possess a valid
Firearm Owner's Identification Card. Id.
237. Id. at para. 10-5. Other additions to the child abduction statute provide that a
person commits child abduction when he or she:
[l]Intentionally conceals or removes the child from a parent after being served
with process in an action affecting marriage or paternity but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody; or [2] At the expiration
of visitation rights outside the State, intentionally fails or refuses to return or
impedes the return of the child to the lawful custodian in Illinois; or [3] Being a
parent of the child, and where the parents of such child are or have been married and there has been no court order of custody, conceals the child for 15
days, and fails to make reasonable attempts within the 15 day period to notify
the other parent as to the whereabouts of the child or to arrange reasonable
visitation or contact with the child. It is not a violation of this Section for a
person fleeing domestic violence to take the child with him or her to services
provided by a domestic violence program; or [4] Being a parent of the child, and
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Public Act 84-160 also expands the child abduction statute by
making it a crime to intentionally lure a child under the age of
sixteen into a motor vehicle without the consent of the parent.238
In addition, Public Act 84-1281 provides that239attempting to lure a
child is as serious a crime as actually luring.
The Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act was passed
by the Illinois General Assembly as a preventative measure in the
area of child abuse. 24 0 This act requires a person who has been
convicted two or more times for certain sex offenses to register
with the local chief of police. 241 The person will be informed of his
duty to register upon release from a prison or hospital.242 Any person who violates the registration
requirement will be guilty of a
243
Class A Misdemeanor.
3.

24
Aggravated Arson

Public Act 84-1100 changes arson into a lesser included offense
of aggravated arson by deleting the words from the latter statute
"by means of fire or explosive" and adding "in the course of committing arson. ' This change is in accord with the Illinois
Supreme Court's recent opinion in People v. Wick.246
4.

Theft 247

An amendment to the theft statute increases the classification of
"theft of property, other than a firearm, not from the person and
where the parents of the child are or have been married and there has been no
court order of custody, conceals, detains, or removes the child with physical
force or threat of physical force; or [5] Conceals, detains, or removes the child
for payment or promise of payment at the instruction of a person who has no
legal right to custody; or [6] Retains in this State for 30 days a child removed
from another state without the consent of the lawful custodian or in violation of
a valid court order of custody.
Id.
238. Id. at para. 10-5(b)(4). This new law changes the age requirement of the victim
from thirteen to sixteen. Id.
239. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10-5(b)(10) (Supp. 1986). Both luring and attempting to lure are Class 4 felonies. Id. at para. 10-5(d).
240. Id. at paras. 221-230.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1985). See supra notes 102-08 and
accompanying text.
245. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 20-1.1 (1985).
246. 107 Ill. 2d 62, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985). See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying
text.
247. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 16-1(e)(1) (1985).
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not exceeding $300 in value" from a misdemeanor to a Class 4
felony. 248 The new amendment will apply only if the offender previously has been convicted of robbery, armed robbery, burglary,
residential burglary, or home invasion.249
5.

250
Residential Burglary

In response to People v. Bales,25 i the General Assembly redefined
"dwelling" for purposes of the residential burglary statute. Even
though the former statute's definition of "dwelling" applied to burglary,25 2 the Illinois Supreme Court in Bales 25 3 declined to apply

that definition of "dwelling" to residential burglary.254 The new
law defines dwelling, for the purposes of the residential burglary
statute, emphasizing the possibility of people being present in their
homes.255 This amendment thus highlights the residential burglary
statute's purpose of ensuring the safety of people in their homes.25 6
6.

Bribery 257

The legislature also expanded the scope of the bribery statute.
Previously, the act of attempting to influence the function of any
public officer, public employee, or juror was not included in the
definition of bribery. 258 The statute, however, now encompasses
the act of attempting to influence.
248. Id.
249. Id. Under former paragraph 16-1(e)(1), the offense was enhanced only when the
defendant had a previous conviction for theft, other than theft of a firearm. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1(e)(1) (1985). Both the former and amended theft statutes are
codified in ILL. REV. STAT. (1985).
250. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-6 (Supp. 1986).
251. 108 Ill. 2d 182, 483 N.E.2d 517 (1985). See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
252. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-6 (1985). Former paragraph 2-6 and new paragraph 2-6(a) define dwelling as "a building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle, or other
enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-6(a) (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
2-6 (1985).
253. 108 Ill. 2d 182, 483 N.E.2d 517 (1985). See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
255. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 2-6(b) (Supp. 1986). Paragraph 2-6(b) provides,
"[flor the purposes of Section 19-3 of this Code [residential burglary], 'dwelling' means a
house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters in which at the time of
the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence intend
within a reasonable period of time to reside."
256. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
257. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33-1(e) (1985).
258. Id.
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C. New Offenses
25 9
1. Aggravated Unlawful Restraint
The newly enacted aggravated unlawful restraint statute makes
it a Class 3 felony to commit unlawful restraint while armed with a
deadly weapon.2 °
2.

26 1
Disarming a Peace Officer

Disarming a peace officer occurs whenever one knowingly disarms a peace officer while the officer is engaged in his official duties.262 The statute also requires that the offense occurs without the
officer's consent.263
3.

Public Aid Wire Fraud 26 4 and Public
265
Aid Mail Fraud

Two offenses concerning public aid fraud were created to prevent people from unlawfully obtaining state public aid payments.
Public aid wire fraud occurs when the offender utilizes a telephone,
wire, radio or television in furtherance of a plan to defraud a state
public aid program.266 Public aid mail fraud occurs when a person
utilizes the postal service to further an unlawful scheme to defraud
a state public aid program.267 Both offenses are Class 4 felonies.268
IV.

CONCLUSION

The judicial decisions and new legislation discussed in this article represent the major developments in Illinois substantive criminal law since July, 1985. During that time, both the Illinois
Supreme Court and the Illinois General Assembly made significant
contributions to that body of law. Although the court and the legislature were independently active in a number of areas, there were
259. Id. at para. 10-3.1. A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful
restraint when he knowingly, without legal authority, detains another while using a
deadly weapon. Aggravated unlawful restraint is a Class 3 felony. Id.
260. Id. at para. 10-3. The unlawful restraint statute provides, "A person commits
the offense of unlawful restraint when he knowingly, without legal authority, detains another". Id. Unlawful restraint is a Class 4 felony. Id.
261. Id. at para. 31-1(a).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 17-9 (Supp. 1986).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 266-67.

Criminal Law

1986]

also important areas of common concern. Both the court and the
legislature took actions to curb the problem of DUI and assist the
prosecution of such cases.2 69 The court and the legislature also undertook to address the vexing problem of legally inconsistent verdicts in homicide cases.27 ° In two areas, residential burlary and
aggravated arson, the court first ruled upon the constitutionality of
the particular statute, and the legislature responded with amendments to reflect the court's decisions and adopted a construction
deemed by the court as necessary to make the statute constitutional. 27' Thus, the recent developments in this area have in many

respects been the product of a dialogue between the judiciary and
the legislature. With the enactment of sweeping new reforms in the
areas of DUI, 272 feticide, 27 3 and homocide, 2 74 and the litigation

such developments are likely to spawn, the dialogue between the
court and the legislature promises to continue.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

109-28, 204-15 and accompanying text.
14-35, 198-203 and accompanying text.
96-108, 244-46, 250-56 and accompanying text.
204-15 and accompanying text.
216-31 and accompanying text.
198-203 and accompanying text.

